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THE PRICE LEVEL, RELATIVE PRICES, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY: 
ASPECTS OF THE INTER-WAR DEBATE* 
 
            by 
 
           David Laidler 
  (Bank of Montreal Professor, University of Western Ontario) 
Abstract: Recent financial instability has called into question the sufficiency of low inflation as a 
goal for monetary policy. This paper discusses inter-war literature bearing on this question. It 
begins with theories of the cycle based on the quantity theory, and their policy prescription of 
price stability supported by lender of last resort activities in the event of crises, arguing that their 
neglect of fluctuations in investment was a weakness. Other approaches are then taken up, 
particularly Austrian theory which stressed the banking system’s capacity to generate relative 
price distortions and forced saving. This theory was discredited by its association with nihilistic 
policy prescriptions during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, its core insights were 
worthwhile, and also played an important part in Robertson’s more eclectic account of the cycle. 
The latter, however, yielded activist policy prescriptions of a sort that were discredited in the 
post-war period. Whether these now need re-examination, or whether a low inflation regime, in 
which the authorities stand ready to resort to vigorous monetary expansion in the aftermath of 
asset market problems, is adequate to maintain economic stability is still an open question.   
  
*Paper presented on March 28, 2003 at a conference on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability, 
and the Business Cycle” at the Bank for International Settlements” Basel, Switzerland. I am 
grateful to Bill White and Claudio Borio for suggesting that I write this paper, to them, as well as 
Jeff Amato, Joe Bisignano, Andy Filardo and Gabriele Galati, for many interesting discussions 
of its contents, and to the BIS for providing the congenial environment where much preliminary 
work on it was done. Claudio Borio also subsequently provided extremely helpful comments on 
a first complete draft of this essay, as did Roger Garrison, and Roger Sandilands. This version of 
the paper has benefited from discussions with Olivier Blanchard and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, who 
acted a formal discussants at the conference, and also from Barry Eichengreen.    
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Low Inflation and Economic Stability 
The 1990s saw low and stable inflation in many countries. It turned out, however, that, in and of 
itself, this was not a sufficient condition for financial stability more broadly defined, nor for 
stability in the real economy. To be sure, the most dramatic problems, those experienced in Asia 
during 1997-98, or Argentina in 2001, arose in economies where low inflation had been held in 
place by exchange rate pegs - more or less formal, depending upon the specific economy - that 
proved unsustainable, and this was hardly a novel occurrence. Furthermore, asset market 
problems and subsequent slowdowns in real activity have frequently been associated with 
contractionary monetary policy designed to bring general inflationary pressures, themselves the 
visible consequences of earlier monetary over-expansion, under control. For an example here, we 
need look no further than the late 1980s, when general economic expansion and incipient upward 
pressure on inflation were accompanied in an number of countries by bubbles in real estate 
markets, whose subsequent collapse was one of the most visible features of the recession with 
which that decade ended.  
 
Policy Issues, Now and Then 
But, even at the end of the 1980s, real estate bubbles occurred in some economies without being 
accompanied by any obvious general inflationary pressures. The Nordic countries provide a 
notable example here. Furthermore, the high-tech bubble that shocked North American and 
European markets in the late 1990s occurred in markets where monetary policy was aimed at 
domestic goals and inflation remained low. It also had consequences well beyond financial 
markets, involving as it did considerable over-investment in computing and communications 
equipment of all sorts. And in its aftermath, there are fears in a number of countries that bubbles 
are now developing in markets for domestic real estate, not least in the United Kingdom.  
 This experience at the very least raises questions about the adequacy of low inflation as a 
sufficient goal for monetary policy, whether pursued in the context of formal inflation targets, 
which, beginning with New Zealand and Canada, were adopted by an increasing number of 
countries in the 1990s, or less formally, as in the case of Japan in the 1980s or the United States 
in the 1990s.  Perhaps economic performance might be better if, instead of focussing only on the 
behaviour of the general price level, monetary policy also pays attention to countering rapid 
increases in asset prices, even those occurring while, overall, inflation remains well under 
control. 
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 Questions bearing on this issue were much analysed by economists before the Keynesian 
Revolution, and in this essay I shall discuss some highlights of the literature that their debates 
generated.1 In those years, a body of theory dealing with fluctuations that took the influence of 
monetary factors on the general price level as its starting point vied with others that stressed 
monetary effects on relative prices, and on asset prices in particular, and yet others that 
downplayed the role of the monetary system in generating the cycle. These competing views 
yielded sometimes contradictory positions on the sufficiency of price level stability in particular, 
and even monetary measures in general, as a means of avoiding fluctuations. There are, 
nevertheless, certain important differences between the policy problems and approaches of the 
inter-war years and those which dominate present day debates, and these have influenced my 
choice of topics to be discussed below.  
 To begin with, policies aimed at domestic goals, such as low inflation, or economic 
stability more generally, are nowadays self-consciously implemented against a background of 
exchange rate flexibility. In the inter-war years, matters were not so clear cut, and international 
monetary considerations were never too far in the background. But interwar macroeconomic 
theory nevertheless did have a good deal to say that can be applied to illuminating the policy 
choices that nowadays face monetary authorities that have already opted to pursue domestic 
goals. I shall emphasise these aspects of the literature in what follows. As a corollary, I shall 
have relatively little to say about how it treated international monetary arrangements, notably the 
gold standard, which were matters of central policy importance in many countries in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and therefore were extensively discussed.2 
 Furthermore, present day economics largely takes it for granted that activity in the real 
economy is well co-ordinated by market mechanisms, and as a result, discussions tend to focus 
on instability within the financial system. The economic theory of the inter-war years, on the 
other hand,  took very seriously the possibility that the real economy was subject to chronic co-
ordination failures, particularly as far as the allocation of resources over time was concerned. It 
therefore paid considerable attention to fluctuations in investment and imbalances in the capital 
stock, and by and large treated financial instability, not as a problem in and of itself, but as a 
reflection of these deeper phenomena. In this case, I have chosen to follow the emphasis of these 
                                                 
 1In what follows, I draw on my own earlier work on this material, in particular, Laidler (1999) 
 2Bernard and Bisignano (2002) provide an account of interwar debates that is in many respects complimentary to 
this one, inasmuch as it pays particular attention to international monetary factors as sources of domestic policy 
problems, both then and more recently.  
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earlier discussions, because I believe that there are perhaps a few valuable insights into modern 
policy problems that the later literature has been inclined to neglect. 
 
An Outline of the Paper 
This paper begins with an account of theories of the cycle and stabilisation policy that started 
from the quantity theory of money. These are the direct intellectual ancestors of the modern view 
that monetary policy should be aimed at maintaining low and stable inflation. Their exponents 
argued that stabilisation of the general price level was not only the right goal for monetary 
policy, but one whose successful pursuit would, in an of itself, eliminate, or at least markedly 
reduce, the likelihood of real instability. But some of these exponents, particularly those who 
favoured discretionary rather than rule-bound monetary policy, were also strong advocates of the 
monetary authorities making rapid and vigorous use of their lender-of-last-resort powers should 
things nevertheless go wrong, as of course they did, with a vengeance in 1929.  
 Accounting for the stylised facts about fluctuations in investment has always been an 
awkward corner for traditional monetary accounts of the cycle. In what follows, therefore, some 
brief comments on attempts by Cambridge economists to extend the traditional monetary theory 
of the cycle to deal with these facts will precede discussion of an alternative real tradition in 
cycle theory, Marxist in origin, that faces them squarely, and indeed takes their explanation as 
the being the central goal of cycle theory. Many inter-war cycle theorists were acutely aware of 
the challenge that this Marxist tradition posed, and a selection of their responses to it will then be 
examined. 
 Here, I shall begin with Austrian theory, which self-consciously defended the neo-classical 
vision of a stable market economy against the Socialist critique. This theory stressed the role of 
the monetary system in creating, not fluctuations in the general price level, but distortions in 
relative prices that led directly to destabilising imbalances in the structure of the capital stock. It 
will be argued that, though this specific theory’s logical structure was deeply flawed, the 
phenomenon to which it drew attention, forced saving, has considerable appeal as one possible 
means of explaining how asset market imbalances can arise against the background of stable 
prices. However, as will also be shown, when Dennis Robertson incorporated forced saving into 
a more eclectic framework than the neo-classical general equilibrium approach adopted by the 
Austrians, his overall analysis led him to join other Cambridge economists in recommending 
exactly the kind of policy regime whose collapse in the 1970s and 1980s provides the 
background for current pre-occupations with confining monetary policy to the pursuit of low and 
stable inflation, and denying any significant stabilising role to fiscal policy.  
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 In conclusion, it will be suggested that experience in the aftermath of the recent high-tech 
bubble might well provide evidence that will help us to decide whether we need to re-examine 
recommendations such as those of Robertson, or whether the quantity theory inspired advocates 
of discretionary monetary policy were right that a speedy deployment of the central bank’s 
powers to create liquidity is adequate to cope with the consequences of crises that arise under 
monetary policy regimes that are aimed at low and stable inflation..  
 
The Quantity Theory Tradition in Cycle Theory 
The Quantity Theory of Money had its modern origins in the great gold inflation that marked the 
16th and 17th centuries. It was, and remains, in the first instance, a theory about the relationship 
between the quantity of money and the price level, which in its most basic formulation has it that 
causation runs from money to prices, rather than in the opposite direction, and that the price level 
will move in proportion to money, provided that velocity and real output are assumed to be 
constant. Since the first half of the 19th century, however, a particular extension of the quantity 
theory tradition has emphasised the potential for interactions between the supply and demand for 
money to create systematic fluctuations in the price level, and/or the aggregate demand for goods 
and services, which in turn seem to be central features of what was once called the credit cycle, 
but which is nowadays more usually referred to as the business cycle.   
 This approach lays particular stress on recursive patterns of  two-way causation that link 
the price level and the quantity of money within the cycle, a feature which distinguishes it 
sharply from the quantity theory itself, and which has prompted some commentators to refer to it 
as quantity theoretic, rather than to characterise it as a straightforward application of the quantity 
theory. Even though this approach to the cycle has evolved over time, it displays considerable 
continuity, from its first appearances in early 19th century debates about the workings of the 
British monetary system, right down to the monetarism of the 1960s and 1970s which provided 
many of the intellectual foundations for contemporary inflation-targeting regimes. 
 
The 19th Century Background 
Money Credit and Commerce (Marshall, 1923) was a work of its author’s old age, and was by no 
means the most up-to-date work on monetary issues then available, but it would still have been 
of more than antiquarian interest to its intended readers. There is no better evidence of the 
essential continuity of earlier work on the quantity theoretic approach to the cycle than 
Marshall’s exposition of it. He begins by quoting Samuel Jones Loyd’s (later Lord Overstone) 
(1837) characterisation of the cycle:  “It has been well said that “the state of trade revolves 
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apparently in an established cycle. First we find it in a state of quiescence---next, improvement---
growing confidence---prosperity--- excitement---overtrading---convulsion---pressure---
stagnation---distress---ending again in quiescence” (p.243) and soon proceeds to an account of  
“The ordinary course of a fluctuation in commercial credit” that relies heavily on a long passage 
transcribed from Marshall and Marshall (1879, pp. 154-156), which in turn is clearly related to a 
similar account given by John Stuart Mill in his  Principles of Political Economy (1848, 1871, 
pp. 542-543)  
  This particular account of the cycle is typical of the literature it represents. It is vague 
about just what kind of disturbance might initially shift the economy from a state of quiescence 
to improvement, but it emphasises that, once begun, economic expansion will be amplified by 
the recursive interactions of expanding money and credit, rising prices, and the profits made by 
borrowers. This expansion in turn will go on until “trade is in a dangerous condition” (1923, 
p.250) and distrust that creates incentives for lenders to tighten credit begins to set in. Given the 
precarious state of the market after a long bout of speculation, such tightening is sufficient to 
persuade some speculators to begin selling their holdings of goods and set in motion a collapse 
of prices.3 Thereafter, “As credit by growing makes itself grow, so when distrust has taken the 
place of confidence, failure and panic breed panic and failure”(1923, p.250). The essential 
features of the upswing and downswing of the cycle according to this monetary approach were, 
then, rising and falling prices driven by cumulative expansions and contractions of credit and 
bank money. Furthermore, the development of “overtrading” - what we would now call 
speculative bubbles - was seen as an integral feature the final stages of the upswing, while its 
collapse - the bursting of the bubbles in question - was a key characteristic of the onset of the 
downswing.4  
  This vision led naturally to the view that policies capable of stabilising the cycle would 
also eliminate speculative bubbles, not to mention their real consequences. From the very 
beginning, the quantity theoretic literature contained an important strand that advocated legally 
                                                 
 3In 19th century accounts of the cycle, the role of an adverse balance of payments in draining gold from the banking 
system was often accorded an important role in precipitating a downturn. This matter is mentioned by neither Mill 
nor Marshall in the passages referred to here, though both pay considerable attention to it elsewhere in their writings. 
 4I know of no better evidence of this than a cartoon, probably drawn about 1857, of “the Overstone Cycle”, 
reproduced in O’Brien (ed.) (1971). “Excitement” is depicted with bustle abound a  building bearing the sign of the  
“South Pole Warming Company”, and “Convulsion” with an exploding “Royal Bubble Bank”. I am grateful to Denis 
O’Brien for advice about the date of this cartoon, and to Walter Eltis for first drawing my attention the significance 
of its content.   
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enforced monetary rules of one sort or another as a means of ensuring stability. Even by the 
1830s, when Overstone wrote the description quoted by Marshall, it had become clear from 
experience that the mere legal requirement that the liabilities of the banking system, or more 
specifically of the Bank of England, be convertible on demand into gold, was not a sufficient rule 
to eliminate cycles and their accompanying crises, and the Bank Charter Act of 1844, of which 
Overstone was a major architect, attempted to solve this problem by tightening the legal 
restrictions under which the Bank of England operated. The Act established the Bank’s note 
issuing department as what we would now call a currency board, based on gold, in the 
expectation that this would eliminate the monetary system’s capacity to generate the fluctuations 
in money and credit that were necessary for the cycle to persist as a regular feature of economic 
life. This rule too proved inadequate, however, as its Banking School opponents had predicted, 
and as subsequent crises in 1847, 1853 and 1865 soon demonstrated, because its framers had 
paid insufficient attention to the role of bank deposits, including Bank of England deposits, in the 
monetary system. 
  By the 1870s, therefore, it was widely taken for granted that short-run discretionary policy 
(though always conducted against the background of gold convertibility) was required to cope 
with problems created by cycles. The policy envisaged, however,  was not of the counter-cyclical 
type that later came to be associated with the exercise of such discretion. Rather, the British 
Monetary Orthodoxy, encapsulated in Walter Bagehot’s (1873) precepts for central banking, 
recommended no more than that the Bank of England should always be ready to act as a lender 
of last resort to any and all solvent institutions whose survival was threatened by the contagious 
crises which had marked the upper turning point of cycles from 1825 onwards5. As it came to be 
adopted in the last quarter of the 19th century, this orthodoxy was a considerable success in its 
own terms. Gold convertibility was never in question, and though financial crises still occurred 
from time to time, notably that created by the near failure of Baring Brothers in 1890, and fraud 
aside, bank failures were a thing of the past in Britain from the 1870s onwards. This British 
experience was well known to observers in the United States, where crises involving bank 
failures were a regular feature of the financial landscape until 1907, and provided an important 
impetus to the founding of the Federal Reserve system.6 
                                                 
 5The italicised phrase is, of course, taken from the title of Frank Fetter’s still indispensable 1964 history of British 
monetary economics over the years 1797-1875. 
 6For a n influential contemporary account of financial crises in the United States, and the effect that the absence of a 
lender of last resort had on their course, see Sprague (1910)  
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Price Stability as a Policy Goal 
As I have argued in greater detail in Laidler (1991, 2002), even as Bagehot’s policy orthodoxy 
was becoming established in central bank practice, developments in economic theory that would 
ultimately render it obsolete were already getting under way. Marshall himself presented a key 
refinement of the standard monetary account of the cycle in (1887). He linked the expansion and 
contraction of money and credit to rising and falling prices by noting that nominal interest rates 
failed fully to adjust to inflation and deflation, and, like Marshall and Marshall (1879), he 
attributed variations in output and employment to counter-cyclical movements in real wages that 
in turn were the result of the interaction of sticky nominal money wages with more flexible 
output prices. Evidently, both of these sources of trouble could be avoided either by ensuring 
price level stability or by linking debt and wage contracts to a suitable price index. Marshall in 
fact recommended the latter, but this proposal got nowhere in practice.7 In the longer run, 
however, his 1887 work remained important because it provided arguments implying that price 
level stabilization was the key to achieving more general financial and economic stability.  
  Even before the outbreak of World War 1, Irving Fisher, who was well aware of Marshall’s 
contribution, began to advocate his “compensated dollar” scheme as a means of automatically 
stabilising prices, and to campaign for legislation that would subject the newly founded Federal 
Reserve system to a legislated price stability rule. Since the cycle was, in Fisher’s eyes, largely a 
“dance of the dollar”, he confidently expected that the enactment and observance of such a rule 
would eliminate it.8 This campaign continued with varying degrees of intensity, though no 
legislative success, throughout the 1920s, and Henry Simons preserved its basic message in a 
now classic 1936 paper, which would be much cited in post-war monetarist literature.  
  In the inter-war years, however, legislated monetary policy rules were a minority taste, as 
indeed they are now. Even by the mid-1920s, European economies were already facing what 
seemed to be unprecedented policy problems of apparently secular stagnation and mass 
unemployment created by botched attempts to restore the Gold Standard after the end of World-
                                                 
 7It seems to have been Jevons (1875) who first suggested indexation, but only for credit market contracts. Marshall 
extended the proposal to the labour market. 
 8The “compensated dollar” involved varying the gold content of the dollar to offset changes in the price of gold 
relative to a general price index. It seems to have been  first discussed as a logical possibility in a footnote in 
Marshall (1887). Initially, Fisher proposed to have this scheme imposed upon the Federal Reserve system , but it was 
dropped from his later campaigns for a price stability rule. 
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War-1, and discussions of counter-cyclical monetary policy seemed barely relevant in this 
context. Even in the United States, where, before 1929, the debate was dominated by more 
traditional questions, discretionary stabilization policy, “credit control” as it was usually called, 
attracted more support, than did legislated rules, while advocates of both found themselves in an 
ongoing debate with exponents of Banking School ideas inherited from 19th century Britain. 
 
Hawtrey on 1928-1932 
The case for discretionary policy aimed at stabilising prices, and hence the cycle, has roots in the 
late 19th century literature, where an early and eloquent case for using discount rate policy for 
this purpose was made by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell as early as 1898. As Thomas 
Humphrey (2002) has recently reminded us, Wicksell’s positive analysis of inflation was taken 
up (without acknowledgement) by Gustav Cassel (eg. 1928). However, Wicksell derived his 
proposals from a theory of secular inflation, not of the cycle, and Cassel’s variation on his theme 
was deployed in the course of, and probably in support of, one of Fisher’s campaigns for 
subjecting the Federal Reserve system to a price-stability rule.9  In the 1920s, the best known 
exponent of the quantity theoretic approach to cycle theory, and of the discretionary stabilisation 
policy that it seemed to support, was Ralph Hawtrey, an official of the UK Treasury. His works 
were widely read in the United States, and greatly admired too, not least by Allyn Young of 
Harvard, probably the most influential teacher of monetary economics in the country at that 
time.10  
  In Hawtrey’s view, the cycle resulted from what he called the “inherent instability of 
credit” which arose from essentially the same interest rate mechanism that Marshall had 
identified in 1887, although he laid more stress on the role played in that mechanism by inflation 
expectations in his first (1913) exposition of it than in subsequent accounts. To this he added, 
first of all, an analysis of the endogenous cyclical behaviour of what we would now call the 
public’s currency deposit ratio that ensured that an internal drain (inflow) of cash from (into) the 
banks’ reserves that came late in the upswing (downswing) would curtail (enhance) their 
willingness to lend, hence precipitating the cycle’s turning points. And second, he proposed a 
different role for wage stickiness in the cycle. Where Marshall had sticky wages interacting with 
                                                 
 9For documentation of Cassel’s support of price stability legislation in the United States in 1928, see Charles 
Hardy’s discussion of this episode in (1932, pp. 199-206) 
 10I have given an account of Hawtrey’s views in Laidler (1999, pp.112-128). For a recent discussion of his influence 
on Young, and of Young’s own views, see Mehrling (1996, 1997). 
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flexible prices to produce perverse fluctuations in real wages,  Hawtrey saw their main role as 
being to induce stickiness into price level behaviour by way of a mark-up mechanism, hence 
making output, rather than the price level, the variable that adjusted to variations in the money 
supply and, in turn, provoked further variations in the latter.  
  According to Hawtrey, even under an international gold standard, the cycle could in 
principle be ironed out by the judicious use of discount rate policy on the part of central banks 
acting in concert, though, to his credit, he doubted the practical feasibility of doing so 
completely. Nevertheless he believed that stabilisation policy, even imperfectly executed, could 
improve matters, and, as early as (1913), he entertained the logical possibility of an individual 
central bank attempting such a policy under a flexible exchange rate. The Federal Reserve 
system’s cautious attempts during the 1920s at “credit control”, when the scale of US gold 
holdings insulated domestic monetary policy from any international constraints, were very much 
along the lines that he, as well as Young and others under his influence, advocated. 
  As we now know, despite the Fed’s success in maintaining a non-inflationary environment 
in the 1920s, an asset market bubble developed whose collapse in October 1929 ushered in the 
Great Depression. Hawtrey’s (1932) essay on The Art of Central Banking, written in the 
aftermath of these events, throws light on the general question of whether price level stability is a 
sufficient indicator of the success of monetary policy, and discusses in some detail how a central 
bank should respond to a collapsed asset market bubble.  
  One important feature of the traditional monetary theory of the cycle was clearly 
discredited by the events of the 1920s: namely, that theory’s presumption that the swelling of a 
speculative bubble in asset markets required a prior period of general price level inflation driven 
by the over- expansion of bank credit and money to bring it about. Hawtrey (1932) himself 
conceded as much when he asserted explicitly that “the speculation which trebled the average 
market values of shares in the American market between 1923 and 1929 was not due to 
inflation”, and, consistent with this view, he did not blame the market’s collapse in October 1929 
for the severe reduction in aggregate demand that followed. 
 “That spending power did shrink is beyond dispute, but the cause was not the Wall 
Street crisis. The shrinkage of spending power and the Wall Street crisis were both the 
effects of a common cause, the credit contraction towards which the Federal Reserve 
System and the Bank of England had been directing their combined efforts. The Wall 
Street crisis only intensified the depression through its psychological effects.” (p. 80) 
Here, it is worth noting explicitly that, in the case of the U.S., the Fed’s tightening of policy had 
been intended to damp down speculative tendencies that were developing in the economy even 
against a background of overall price level stability, and that some contemporary commentators, 
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for example, Lauchlin Currie (1931) who was Young’s student, and also Hawtrey’s assistant 
during the latter’s visit to Harvard in 1928-29, not to mention later ones such as Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963)  have suggested that the reduction in money growth this attempt brought about 
may in turn have been responsible for the downturn in real activity that began in the summer of 
1929.11 
  After the crash, according to Hawtrey (1932),  the Fed’s efforts to counter the economy’s 
contraction had been inadequate. Interest rates did fall, “but the process was deplorably slow” 
(p.213), while the open market operations undertaken in 1930 were “half-hearted”, so much so 
that, by  the middle of 1930, what Hawtrey usually termed a “credit  deadlock” had developed. 
Such a deadlock was a state of affairs in which there was a general reluctance on the part of the 
business community to borrow from the banking system on any terms offered.  “When that 
happens, it seems to be the extreme of paradox to say that there is a shortage of money. . .” 
(p.172) but that was indeed what ailed the economy. For Hawtrey, “The Central Bank is the 
lender of last resort. That is the true source of its responsibility for the currency” (p.116, 
Hawtrey’s italics), and “The essential duty of the central bank as the lender of last resort is to 
make good a shortage of cash among the competitive banks.” (p.126) Therefore, what was 
always required in the face of a credit deadlock was open market purchases of securities on 
whatever scale was needed to bring about a resumption of spending by the public.12 
  Two points should be made about Hawtrey’s credit deadlock concept. First, it must not be 
confused with the liquidity trap doctrine, which sees a high, and in the limit infinite, interest 
elasticity of demand for money as an obstacle to effective monetary policy, rather than a low, and 
in the limit zero, interest elasticity of demand for credit.13  Second it also differs from the 
                                                 
 11Currie’s 1931 Ph. D thesis, referred to here, was heavily influenced by Hawtrey’s ideas. On this, See Laidler 
(1999, pp. 233-236)  
 12It is worth noting explicitly that there are two elements to the lender of last resort doctrine in 19th century 
discussions, as Humphrey and Keleher (1985) have carefully documented. The first stresses  the central bank’s role 
as a provider of liquidity to the market. The second sees it as providing liquidity to specific institutions, which 
though solvent, are in difficulties. Hawtrey stressed the former element.  Laidler (2002) also discusses this issue. 
Hawtrey, it should be noted, was willing to countenance government expenditure financed by money creation should 
open market operations fail, though he did not think this eventuality very likely. See Laidler (1999, pp. 125-126) on 
this point. 
 13A credit deadlock prevents money being created. In a liquidity trap, money lies idle after it has been created. 
Keynes’ did much to refine the latter concept in the General Theory, though it is not clear that he believed in its 
empirical relevance (See Laidler 1999, pp.258-259). However, a primitive version of the doctrine, that carried with it 
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modern concept of a credit crunch. It locates the principal source of credit market difficulties in 
the public’s unwillingness to borrow from the banking system rather than in the latter’s 
unwillingness, or inability, to lend to the public. Nevertheless, the concepts are not totally 
unrelated: a deadlock in credit relations between the central bank and commercial banks 
stemming from their unwillingness to borrow new reserves can co-exist with a general 
unwillingness on their part to lend to the public at large, and Hawtrey’s insistence on the 
importance of the central bank providing cash to commercial banks seems partially to recognise 
this.     
                                                                                                                                                             
a warning that surplus balances might suddenly be spent, thus creating inflationary instability, was a commonplace 
throughout the 1930s. For example, Hardy (1932, p. 92) argued as follows: “The result of open market purchases 
during a depression might be simply to pile up idle reserves in banks, and idle balances in the hands of individuals, 
until the load gets so great that confidence in the currency suddenly disappears -with the usual accompaniments-an 
accentuated decline of business confidence, budget disorganization, gold hoarding, flight to foreign currencies, and 
finally the complete collapse of the currency system” 
  Be that as it may, with reference to the specific situation in the United States in 1930,  
Hawtrey argued explicitly that “demand could have been revived by a sufficient surplus of idle 
money” (p.242) but pointed out that the Fed. had failed to provide such a surplus. Writing as he 
was in 1932, however, he noted that “Much may be hoped from this policy [open market 
purchases started in March 1932], if it is persisted in.” (p. 242).  In the event, the 1932 initiative 
also proved inadequate, perhaps because the operations were carried out on too small a scale, and 
were brought to end  prematurely. This was certainly the retrospective opinion of Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963), and it was also the contemporary view of Currie, who, in (1934) succinctly 
summed up the lessons of 1929-32 period in the following terms. 
 13 
 “Much of the current belief in the powerlessness of the reserve banks appears to arise 
from a complete misreading of the monetary history of 1929-32. It is generally held that 
the reserve administration strove energetically to bring about expansion throughout the 
depression but that contraction continued despite its efforts. Actually the reserve 
administration’s policy was one of almost complete passivity and quiescence,” (Currie, 
1934, p. 147) 
  This is not the place to debate the adequacy of an essentially monetary interpretation of 
the Great Contraction.14 For purposes of this essay it is sufficient to summarise the following 
salient characteristics of the body of economic doctrine of which it came to form so important a 
part. First, and above all, that doctrine treated the cycle as an essentially monetary phenomenon, 
not in the sense that it always had its origins in an exogenous monetary impulse, but in the sense 
that its upswing and downswing represented a process in which expanding (contracting) money 
and credit interacted recursively with rising (falling) prices and demand, and in which turning 
points were initiated by changes in the willingness of the banking system to lend, and hence 
create money. Second, and closely related, that doctrine argued that the cycle could be stabilised 
by measures that would prevent cumulative expansion and contractions of money and credit 
getting under way in the first place. Some of its exponents, for example Fisher, Simons, and, in 
the post-war years, Friedman, thought that this could be achieved by imposing legally binding 
rules of various kinds on the central bank.15 Others, were more cautious, and like Hawtrey, 
preferred a discretionary approach to stabilisation policy, regarded price level stability as a sign 
of its success, but also thought of the central bank’s lender of last resort powers, and more 
specifically its powers to inject liquidity into the banking system, as being a vital second line of 
defence should things nevertheless begin to go wrong, as they did in 1929.16 
                                                 
 14The idea that a monetary interpretation of the Great Contraction and proposals for a monetary cure for it were the 
unique product of a Chicago Tradition was once widely entertained, but is quite insupportable. Some Chicago 
economists, for example Jacob Viner and Henry Simons did indeed support such a view-point, but it neither 
originated at, nor was confined, to Chicago. For a fuller discussion, See Laidler (1999 pp. 231-239).   
 15Fisher always favoured a price stability rule, and Friedman a money growth rule. Simons vacillated between the 
two, but in 1936, opted for price level stability. On this latter point, see Laidler (1999, pp. 241-242) 
 16It should be noted explicitly that, in the early 1930s, as the Great Contraction gathered momentum, Fisher was an 
energetic advocate of monetary expansion aimed at restoring the price level to its 1929 level. His well known “debt 
deflation theory of great depressions” (Fisher 1932, 1933) should be seen as an extension of a quantity theoretic 
analysis of events that focussed on the consequences of rapidly falling prices. That theory added both strength and, 
more important, urgency to Fisher’s longstanding claims on behalf of the virtues of price-level stability.    
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  The vision that has dominated monetary policy since the beginning of the 1990s is clearly 
the latest incarnation of this approach. Its immediate intellectual roots lie in the monetarist 
doctrines of the 1960s and 1970s which did so much to breathe new life into these older ideas, 
and the main factor separating it from these roots has been its replacement of the legislated 
money growth rule favoured by the academic exponents of monetarism with more practically 
oriented inflation targets as anchors for monetary policy. This shift of emphasis has provided 
policy makers with what they would defend as a much needed degree of discretion in their 
choice of policy instruments and in their ability to manipulate of them.  
  And yet, just as things went wrong in the US in 1929, even though the price level seemed 
to be behaving well, so they went wrong in Japan at the beginning of the 1990s under similar 
circumstances, and again in the United States, and to a lesser degree in Europe too, in 2001. In 
each case an asset market bubble seems to have developed and collapsed without this event 
being preceded by any general upsurge of inflation. With the passage of time, it has become 
tempting to treat the boom of the late 1920s that ended with the bursting of the stock market 
bubble in 1929 as an outlier, but the recent occurrence of two apparently similar episodes  
suggests that there are forces at work in the economy that are not properly integrated into those 
explanations of the cycle and doctrines about macroeconomic stabilization that derive from the 
quantity theory of money. That was precisely the opinion of a large number of economists 
writing in the interwar period, as we shall now see. 
 
 
Investment and Real Explanations the Cycle 
The monetary theories of the cycle discussed above have, formally speaking, no special place for 
investment expenditure. Within them, it is simply one component of aggregate demand that is 
affected by monetary impulses. And yet no exponent of this approach would have denied that 
asset market bubbles were financial market manifestations of deeper imbalances that had arisen 
within the structure of the economy’s capital stock, or that their collapses had been accompanied 
by the recognition of these real imbalances and an associated cessation, or at least a dramatic 
slowdown, of investment activity. 
 Even in the early 1860s, when economists first began to recognise that the cycle involved 
systematic fluctuations in real variables, it was known that investment activity was particularly 
prone to large swings. Thus, Jevons (1863) conjectured that the fundamental causes of  “great 
commercial fluctuations, completing their course in some ten years” seemed to lie “in the 
varying proportion which the capital devoted to permanent and remote investment bears to that 
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which is but temporarily invested soon to reproduce itself.” (p. 27, Jevons’ italics), and he further 
noted that “It is the peculiarity . . .of great and permanent works . . .to be multiplied at particular 
periods.” (p. 28). Monetary theorists of the cycle were just as aware of these facts as anyone else. 
In (1879) Marshall and Marshall had singled out for special mention “. . . companies [that]. . 
.have borrowed vast sums with which they have begun to build docks and ships and ironworks 
and factories” and whose projects were not yet complete as the crisis phase of the cycle 
approaches, and in (1923) Marshall himself still found this passage sufficiently important to 
quote, as we have already seen..  
 Hawtrey too was conscious of the empirical importance of fluctuations in fixed investment, 
and, in his first book, Good and Bad Trade (1913, p. 207)) he went so far as to outline a simple 
accelerator mechanism as an explanation of the phenomenon. But it is one thing to recognise and 
attempt to explain what we would now call a stylized fact, and another to incorporate that 
explanation systematically into the logical structure of a model, and this he failed to do. In 
(1913), the accelerator was tacked on to Hawtrey’s analysis, and it disappeared altogether from 
Currency and Credit (1919), the book that would nowadays be regarded as containing the 
definitive exposition of his theory of the cycle. 
 
Marshall’s Cambridge Successors 
But Hawtrey, though a Cambridge graduate, and despite the similarities between his cycle theory 
and Marshall’s, is not usually regarded as his intellectual heir, at least within academic 
economics. Credit for developing Marshall’s thought at Cambridge in the 1920s and 1930s is 
usually allocated, according to the commentator’s taste, among Arthur C. Pigou, Frederick W. 
Lavington, and of course John Maynard Keynes, and in the inter-war years all of these made 
serious and systematic efforts to incorporate the behaviour of investment into the Cambridge 
cycle theory which Marshall had built on quantity-theoretic foundations.17 
 Pigou and Lavington overlaid Marshall’s account of the cumulative nature of upswings and 
downswings with what was often characterised as a psychological theory, in which errors of 
optimism and of  pessimism  drove business decisions, errors which were correlated across agents 
and tended to be amplified with the passage of time. Furthermore, 
 “Inasmuch as optimism or pessimism naturally has greater influence on business 
judgements the less certain the basis on which those judgements rest, it is only to be 
expected that this influence should be most marked, and maladjustments of resources 
                                                 
 17I have discussed the work of Pigou and Lavington in Laidler (1999, pp. 83-90) and Keynes of the Tract and 
Treatise in pp. 106-112 and pp.130-154, respectively of the same work. 
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consequently most evident, in the output of new capital plant designed to produce goods 
for very far-ahead and uncertain markets.” (Lavington, 1922, p. 91)  
 Cambridge theorists thus brought swings in investment into the explanation of the cycle as 
a supplement to the recursive interactions among money, credit and prices that had dominated 
Marshall’s account. As a corollary, they no longer regarded stabilisation of the price level as 
sufficient to eliminate the cycle. Pigou (1929) opined as follows:  “I hold that, if a policy of price 
stabilisation were successfully carried through, the amplitude of industrial fluctuations would be 
substantially reduced - it might be cut down to half of what it is at present - but considerable 
fluctuations would still remain.” (p. 219) He advocated activist monetary policy, supplemented 
by public works expenditure if need be, an approach to macroeconomic policy which was widely 
implemented in the post-war years, only to be discredited by the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s 
which ushered in the era of inflation targeting. 
 At one time it was usual to credit (or debit) Keynes (1936) with originating the case for 
such policies, but it is by now uncontroversial that the major contribution of the General Theory 
to inter-war policy controversy was to provide a more rigorous theoretical rationalisation than 
had previously existed for an already widely accepted activism. Indeed Keynes was rather a late-
comer to that position. The Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) starts just as clearly from the 
quantity theory as anything that Hawtrey produced in the 1920s.18 As to the Treatise on Money 
(1930), though it located the key to cyclical swings in the influence of the long rate of interest on 
savings and investment, its formal analysis (as opposed to informal discussion) extended only to 
cyclical swings in the price level. Its policy advice for dealing with the then just beginning Great 
Contraction - “open market operations a outrance” - was, moreover, no different from 
Hawtrey’s, though its theoretical basis was different. It was only after the publication of the 
Treatise that Keynes began to move decisively towards the policy positions later associated with 
his name, and, not entirely co-incidentally, to adopt an explanation of fluctuations in investment 
that, focussing as it did on the role of animal spirits, differed from that offered earlier by 
Lavington and Pigou more in vocabulary than in substance. 
 We shall return to the matter of generalised macroeconomic activism below, but first we 
need to look at approaches to explaining the cycle that paid even closer attention to the role of 
                                                 
 18Large parts of the Tract should be read as constructive comments about the practicalities of the Genoa Resolutions 
of 1923, whose principle architect was Hawtrey, offered by a critic who completely accepted their analytic basis. See 
Laidler (1999, pp.106-107, 122-123) Those resolutions sought to re-establish the gold standard as a basis for 
internationally co-ordinated monetary stabilization policy, and Keynes’s proposals for a heavily managed float 
between sterling and the US dollar amounted to a modification of this recommendation. 
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investment in economic fluctuations than did anything developed at Cambridge, and therefore 
deviated much more radically from the quantity theory tradition. 
 
The Influence of Marx and Wicksell. 
The quantity theory of money was far from providing the only starting point for thinking about 
the cycle in the 19th century. Karl Marx’s Capital (1867) set out an alternative and very different 
view of the workings of the market economy. Rather than present capitalism as a system which, 
if left to itself, tended to converge on some sort of full-employment equilibrium in the wake of 
monetary disturbances, Marx identified a process of inherently unstable cyclical economic 
growth as its central feature, and he expressed contempt for any purely monetary explanation of 
fluctuations: “The superficiality of political economy shows itself in the fact that it looks upon 
the expansion and contraction of credit, which is a mere symptom of the periodic changes of the 
industrial cycle, as their cause.” (1867, p. 633) 
 For Marx, the cycle was not the outcome of a series of shocks that created fluctuations 
around an equilibrium growth path. Rather it was the essential characteristic of that growth path, 
the inevitable consequence of the relentless pursuit of profit by the capitalist class. In the 
expansion phase, individual capitalists pursued relative surplus value by investing in ever more 
efficient labour saving machinery, but from the viewpoint of their class as a whole, this was self 
defeating. In a competitive market economy, the value of goods was determined by the labour 
socially necessary to produce them, and the very process of widespread investment in innovative 
technology reduced this. Thus the economy-wide rate of profit was also driven down, bringing 
about a crisis and a halt to the economy’s expansion. Labour was then released into the reserve 
army of the unemployed and would provide cannon-fodder for the next expansion. A succession 
of ever more violent cycles would culminate in a crisis severe enough to provoke revolution. 
 Now many more economists were influenced by this vision of the cycle than adopted the 
revolutionary Socialist doctrines that Marx believed it to imply. Indeed, in the period that is the 
focus of this paper, theories that emphasised the role of innovation as the main impetus driving 
cyclical growth were probably a majority taste among continental economists. A large literature 
noted the challenges posed to the stability of the growth process by the time lags inherent in the 
construction of capital goods, and their indivisibility and durability once they were in place. It is 
impossible to do justice to the non-quantity-theoretic, but nevertheless monetary, analyses of the 
cycle to which the next section of this paper is devoted without understanding that they are the 
outcome of attempts to reconcile these ideas, which may here conveniently be labelled as 
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representing a real tradition in business cycle analysis, to neoclassical doctrines which placed 
more emphasis on monetary factors.19 
 A crucial link between these two traditions lies in the work of Wicksell, who, though 
apparently little known among economists writing in English until the late 1920s, was influential 
elsewhere from a much earlier date.20 His now well known cumulative process analysis focussed 
on the interaction of the market rate of interest, set by banks, with the natural rate, which in 
various places, and inconsistently, he defined as the marginal product of capital, the rate of 
interest at which saving and investment would be equal in a frictionless barter economy, and the 
rate of interest to which the market rate had to be equated to stabilize the price level.21 Wicksell 
himself thought of this analysis as extending the quantity theory of money to a world dominated 
by banks, and saw it as a tool for explaining secular movements in the price level rather than 
cyclical fluctuations. It was also his view that, in the 19th century at least, such movements had 
mainly originated on the real side of the economy as productivity shocks drove the natural rate of 
interest away from the market rate.  
 Consistent with this, Wicksell’s few sketchy writings on the cycle show him to have been 
close to the real business cycle tradition, more particularly that branch of it that is particularly 
associated with Marx and, later, Joseph Schumpeter in emphasising the role of technical change 
as the fundamental source of economic fluctuations, and sceptical about attributing any 
                                                 
 19Much of the relevant literature was written in German, and it is one of the many virtues of Harald Hagemann’s 
(2002) four volume collection of key papers in the development of business cycle analysis that several critical 
contributions are made available in English for the first time.  
 20The question of Wicksell’s influence on English language economics is a thorny one. It is usually accepted that, 
before the considerable attention given to it by Keynes in the Treatise, his work was largely unknown, and certainly 
it was not cited before then in England. In the United  States Fisher (1911, pp. 59-60) did acknowledge his work, 
however, and a key paper summarising his theory of inflation (Wicksell 1907) was presented at the meetings of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science and published in the Economic Journal. 
 21The inconsistency between defining the natural rate in terms of its capacity to generate price level stability and 
equilibrium between savings and investment will be discussed below. The very real problems inherent as treating it 
as the marginal product of capital per unit of capital in a world of heterogeneous capital goods are not quite central 
to this paper, and will not be discussed. For my own views on this contentious issue, see Laidler (1999, pp. 33-34, 
53-57)  
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important causative role to the monetary sector.22 Small wonder then, that Wicksell’s successors 
saw the potential for his cumulative process to become a starting point for cycle theories based 
on the idea that the monetary sector interacts with the real economy by way of the influence of 
the interest rate on savings and investment, and used it as such, thus providing an alternative to 
monetary theories that began from the influence of the quantity of money on prices. 
  
Forced Saving, Relative Prices and the Cycle  
Real cycle theory and Wicksellian monetary economics crucially influenced, on the one hand, 
the work of the so-called Austrians - Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek and Lionel 
Robbins among others -, and of Dennis Robertson on the other.23 The first these, exponents of a 
self-consciously individualist economics that was closely allied to political liberalism, reacted 
strongly against any presumption that market economies were inherently unstable, and their 
work should be seen as an attempt to refute this postulate, while reconciling the basic facts of the 
cycle, including those concerning investment activity, with neo-classical orthodoxy. In contrast, 
Robertson’s earliest book, A Study of Industrial Fluctuation (1915) was heavily empirical, 
located firmly and sympathetically in the tradition of explaining the cycle in terms of waves of 
fixed investment driven by innovation, and it acknowledged the specific influence of the work of 
Michael Tugan-Baranowski and Albert Aftalion.24  It was only in the 1920s, under the influence 
of Keynes, that Robertson broadened his analysis to accord a significant role to monetary factors 
in the cycle. 
 Though they proceeded independently of one another, and initially in ignorance of each 
others’ work too, the Austrians and Robertson developed views of the role of the monetary 
system in the economy that had many analytic properties in common. Critically for the matters 
under discussion in this paper, these views led them to be sceptical about the sufficiency of price 
level stability for the overall stability of the economy, and to propose price deflation at the 
economy’s rate of productivity growth as a defence against the development of  imbalances in 
                                                 
 22Schumpeter’s definitive contribution to this tradition, which amply justifies the coupling of his name with that of 
Marx in defining it, was not published until (1939) and therefore lies beyond the scope of this paper. On his 
interesting, but hardly central, contributions to the debates of the early 1930s, see Laidler (1999, pp.216-218)  
 23I have discussed the Austrians’ work in Laidler (1999, pp. 27-50) and that of Robertson as well (pp.90-99)  
 24Samples of the work of both of these are available in Volume II of Hagemann’s collection. 
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financial markets and, more fundamentally, in the underlying structure of the real capital stock.25  
But, Robertson also differed sharply from the Austrians on some important matters. In particular 
his scepticism about the capacity of market mechanisms to function smoothly without help from 
policy makers led him to be much more activist in his advice than were they. 
 
Forced Saving in Austrian Analysis 
As Hagemann (1994) has pointed out, though Hayek’s Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle did 
not appear in English until 1933, its German version was written in 1928, initially as a response 
to the socialist economist Adolf Loewe (later Adolph Lowe). Loewe (1926) had challenged not 
just a particular approach to cycle theory, but the entire paradigm of neo-classical theory as it 
was then represented by general equilibrium analysis. He had argued that the basic claim that the 
economic system had a tendency always to return towards equilibrium after an exogenous 
disturbance was inconsistent with the obvious fact that actual economies continuously moved 
over time in a series of cyclical swings that never showed any sign of coming to rest, let alone in 
any state that remotely resembled such an equilibrium. This observation was, in his view, more 
consistent with a  vision of an essentially unstable system driven by an open ended process of 
capital accumulation than anything offered by neo-classical theory.26 
 It is easy to forget nowadays that, perhaps especially in the German speaking world of the 
late 1920s, a challenge like this was of more than merely academic significance. What was 
required to meet it in the eyes of committed liberals like the Austrians was, first a model 
inhabited by maximising agents, initially in general equilibrium, which, when subjected to a 
certain type of disturbance would move along a time path that for a while led cumulatively away 
from the initial equilibrium, and then reversed direction only to overshoot that same equilibrium, 
and second, some insight into how these tendencies could be curbed. Hayek attempted to rebut 
Loewe by arguing that a business cycle theory such as that already sketched by Ludwig von 
Mises  in (1912, 1924) would do just this. Many of his contemporaries agreed with him, and 
                                                 
 25George Selgin (1997) has recently restated the case for aiming monetary policy at a rate of deflation equal to the 
economy’s rate of productivity growth., arguing that, relative to price level stability, such a goal “(1) is likely to 
involve lower ‘menu’ costs of price adjustment; (2) is less likely to invite monetary misperception effects; (3) is 
more conducive to the achievement of efficient outcomes using fixed nominal contracts; and (4) generally keeps the 
money stock closer to its ‘optimum’ level.” (p.70) 
 26Translations of two important papers by Loewe (1926-28 and 1926) are now available in Hagemann (ed.) (2002, 
Vols. III and IV,) respectively, while a translation of Hayek’s original (1928) reply appears in Vol. III).  
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Hayek’s own elaboration of this theory in his (1931) LSE lectures on Prices and Production for 
a while looked set to create a revolution in macroeconomic thought of a magnitude achieved a 
little later by Keynes. 
 Mises’ original insight had come in response to a puzzle posed by Wicksell.’s cumulative 
process analysis. In an economy that used currency as well as bank deposits as money, and in 
which the banks held reserves, a shortfall of the market from the natural rate of interest could not 
persist. The inflation that it generated would increase the public’s demand for currency, and the 
resulting drain of reserves from the banks would cause them to raise the market rate so that it 
equalled the natural rate, thus restoring equilibrium to both the real economy and its monetary 
sector. But Wicksell had also analysed the theoretically limiting case of a pure credit economy, 
in which there was no currency, and all transactions were carried out using deposits. Here, if a 
shortfall of the market from the natural rate of interest led only to inflation, there would be no 
mechanism to bring the market rate back into equilibrium with the natural rate, and 
disequilibrium could apparently persist for ever. Mises found the conclusion deeply 
discomfiting, and in order to meet the challenge it presented, he introduced  the process now 
known as forced saving into the Wicksellian framework.27 
 This mechanism depends crucially upon three special assumptions, the first two of which 
Mises, Hayek, and most other exponents of forced saving usually left unstated.  The first is that 
the newly created bank deposits that enter circulation when the natural rate of interest exceeds 
the market rate do so by way of loans to firms; in modern terminology, for forced saving to 
occur, there must be limited participation in the market for bank credit. The second is that any 
effects on the general price level that arise from money creation leave the real consumption plans 
of the general public unaffected; in modern equilibrium models of inflation, money holders vary 
their consumption in order to maintain their real balances in equilibrium as the inflation rate 
varies, thus paying seigniorage to the creators of nominal balances, but for the forced saving 
mechanism to work along Austrian lines, the effects of nominal money creation must be 
unanticipated. Finally, and Hayek would elevate this assumption to a methodological principle, 
                                                 
 27It should be noted that The Austrians did not originate the idea of forced saving and that Wicksell was aware of it 
though he did not explore its implications for his cumulative process. The idea can be traced back to the very 
beginning of the 19th century. Hayek (1932) provides the still standard account of the doctrine’s development from 
its origins in comments by Jeremy Bentham and Henry Thornton.  
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in Austrian analysis any conceptual experiment involving variations in the rate of money 
creation had to begin with the economy in full general equilibrium at full employment.28 
 On these three assumptions,  money creation following the opening up of a discrepancy 
between the natural and market rates of interest can have certain effects beyond those on the 
general price level that Wicksell analysed. This money goes, in the first instance, into the hands 
of firms for whom the expected return on new investments (the natural rate) is now higher than 
the rate of interest at which they are borrowing (the market rate). The demand for investment 
goods thus increases, and the firms that produce them are able to bid  resources away from the 
consumption goods sector. Households, who have anticipated none of this, are, in effect, forced 
to reduce their consumption, and therefore to increase their saving, in real terms.  
 In the Austrian way of putting these matters, a voluntary decision to save by households is 
simultaneously a decision to consume at some time in the future, while a decision to invest by 
firms is simultaneously a decision to supply consumption goods in the future, and the rate of 
interest is the crucial relative price that co-ordinates these choices. Only so long as the market 
rate of interest is equal to the natural rate does it accomplish this, and create a state of what was 
usually called monetary neutrality. Another way of looking at the process of forced saving, then, 
is to observe that a shortfall of the market rate of interest below its natural value involves firms 
receiving a signal that the price of future consumption goods has risen relative to that of present 
consumption goods, and that they should switch the production of such goods from the present to 
the future, without households having transmitted any such signal. The latter reduce current 
consumption because the operations of the monetary system compel them to do so, and not 
because they want to raise their future consumption. 
  In short, forced saving is the outcome of a co-ordination failure with respect to the inter-
temporal allocation of resources. It occurs because a relative price is set at a disequilibrium value 
by the banking system. The longer it continues, the greater is the imbalance created between 
firms’ capacity to provide consumer goods in the future, and households’ desires to purchase 
                                                 
 28The limited participation assumption presumably reflects the characteristics of universal banking as practised on 
the Continent in the 1920s. The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated inflation was simply not part of 
the infra-structure of macroeconomic theory in the 1920s, even though certain ideas that we now know to depend 
crucially upon it - the Fisher effect and the inflation tax - were current. As to assuming full employment, it seemed 
only proper that an explanation of unemployment should begin at full employment and show how unemployment 
could then develop. As it happened, the task of assuming, without explanation, the existence of unemployment, and 
then showing how its level could change, proved much more tractable, and its results much more illuminating too, as 
Brinley Thomas (1936), who built on foundations provided by the Stockholm School would note. See Laidler (1999, 
pp. 63-64)     
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them, an imbalance that is matched by a shortfall in firms’ ability to meet households’ current 
demand for consumer goods. But, continue it will, so long as the crucial inter-temporal relative 
price remains at the wrong level.  
 
Crises as the Inevitable Result of Forced Saving 
Up to this point, given the assumptions underlying the analysis, the conclusions follow. It is 
indeed the case that the banking system’s power to make loans with newly created deposits that 
have no counterpart in savings decisions by households can be a source of disturbances to 
investment and saving, that these can persist for a while, and that this can cause trouble. But the 
conclusions that Mises, and after him, Hayek,  Robbins and others went on to draw from this 
insight were, when considered in the light of the criticism to which they were subsequently 
subjected, highly speculative, to say the least.  
 In particular the assumption that it begins at full employment is critical to the forced saving 
process. If resources are not fully utilised when firms receive a signal to increase investment, 
then they can clearly do so without forcing a decrease in consumption. Indeed there is room for 
both investment and consumption to increase together. Since cyclical upswings typically begin 
from a trough that is characterised by unemployment generated during a previous downswing, 
forced saving cannot be a feature of the whole cycle, but only, at most, of the later stages of its 
upswing when resource constraints have begun to bite. 
 This insight, however, was not available to the Austrians in the late 1920s, and they argued 
that, once an expansion was under way, whose central feature was always, in their view,  a 
process of forced saving, a crisis was inevitably in the making. It would involve the excess 
demand for current consumption goods making itself felt before new investment goods had been 
completed and brought into production. More by a leap of intuition than careful analysis, the 
Austrians identified the disruption associated with attempts to unwind the imbalances created by 
forced saving with the onset of the downswing and subsequent depression, and they suggested 
that analysis along these lines “leads ultimately to a theory of business cycles” (Mises, 1924, p. 
365). According to that theory, as elaborated, for example by Hayek (1931), crises could be 
staved off temporarily by keeping the market rate of interest below the natural rate, but this 
would be at the cost of making them more severe when they arrived. And arrive they eventually 
would, for a side effect of prolonging the process of forced saving by ever more credit creation 
would be an inflation rate that would rise to ultimately intolerable levels. As Lionel Robbins put 
it in (1934) 
“Once costs have begun to rise it would require a continuous increase in the rate of 
increase of credit to prevent the thing coming to disaster. But that itself, as we have seen in 
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the great post-war inflations, would eventually generate panic. Sooner or later the initial 
errors are discovered. And then starts a reverse rush for liquidity. The Stock Exchange 
collapses. There is a stoppage of new issues. Production in the industries producing capital 
goods slows down. The boom is at an end.” (pp. 41-42) 
 This is not the place to embark on a detailed critique of Austrian cycle theory. Suffice it to 
suggest that its exponents took logical possibilities implicit in the analysis of forced saving, and 
treated them as logical necessities.29  As one sympathetic modern commentator has remarked,  
“the Austrian theory is not a theory of depression per se, but rather a theory of the unsustainable 
boom” (Garrison,2001,  p. 240). Given the Austrians’ underlying agenda, however, which was to 
produce a theory of the cycle that was compatible with a general equilibrium theory strongly 
tinged with methodological individualism, and  could be used to counter socialist critiques of a 
liberal capitalist society, and given that the great hyper-inflations were a recent memory, one can 
see how they were led into their over-generalizations. 
 
Forced Saving without Price Inflation 
For all its weaknesses however, one feature of Austrian analysis remains particularly relevant to 
the topic of this paper: namely, the insight that forced saving can nevertheless take place and 
create trouble against a background of stable, or even falling prices. This possibility, which sets 
Austrian theory apart from a more traditional quantity theoretic approach to the cycle, as 
Garrison (2001, p. 242) stresses,  arises when the effects of economic growth, particularly that 
which arises from productivity improvements as opposed to mere increases in population, are 
brought into the picture.30  
                                                 
 29See Laidler 1999, pp. 45-46,  pp. 51-75, and pp. 63-67, for accounts of and references to  contemporary treatments 
of forced saving that suggested that an initial excess of investment over saving might generate an equilibrating 
response on the part of savers. Among the possibilities that the Austrians did not notice, but were raised by their 
contemporaries, were that changes in the distribution of income from wages to profits during the upswing might 
cause an increase in voluntary saving and eliminate disequilibrium between saving and investment,  that the creation 
of an appropriate amount of new bank credit by way of consumer loans (at that time a new phenomenon, largely 
confined to the US) could enable households to hold their own in competition with firms, and that, as inflation 
became anticipated agents would increase their saving in order to maintain their holdings of real balances. The last 
effect will be discussed below, in the context of Robertson’s work.  
 30The literature associated with the forced saving concept sometimes encountered extremely heavy weather in 
dealing with this distinction between the sources of economic growth. Dennis Robertson (1926, 1928a and b) whose 
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 Wicksell had defined the natural rate of interest as that which would equate saving and 
investment at full employment, hence implying zero credit creation by the banking system, but 
he had also defined it as the interest rate which, if it ruled in the market place, would  generate 
stable prices. In a stationary economy, where savings and investment are equal to zero, these two 
definitions are compatible, but not in a growing economy. There, on the assumption that the 
velocity of circulation is constant, zero credit creation implies deflation at the economy’s rate of 
growth. Given this, and the assumption that its effects on the price level are unanticipated, forced 
saving is always implicit in positive credit creation in conditions of full employment, and will 
occur in a growing economy whenever the rate of price level change lies above that rate of 
deflation.31 The potential significance of this conclusion for the behaviour of the US economy in 
the 1920s was not lost on the Austrians, and it formed the basis of their interpretation of the 
Great Contraction and its aftermath.  
 But to explain 1929 and its aftermath as a crisis created by a prior process of forced saving 
required them to argue that disequilibria in the inter-temporal allocation of resources sufficient to 
have provoke it had built up even without the onset of general inflation. On Hayek’s treatment of 
this specific point, Gottfried von Haberler, himself an ardent exponent of Austrian theory in 
(1932), would later remark “the reasoning is not . . .altogether convincing” (1937, p. 52), and his 
more general conclusion was   
“. . .that the present theory does not prove, as it claims to do, that a credit expansion which 
does not lead to a rise in prices but only prevents a fall in prices must have the same evil 
effect as the more violent type which brings about a rise in the absolute price level” (p. 51) 
Once again, we see the Austrians criticised for claiming that a logically possible outcome was 
logically necessary. But we should also note that, as far as the sufficiency of price level stability 
for general economic stability is concerned, the mere logical possibility that forced saving can 
cause trouble under such a regime is of some significance.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
variation on the forced saving theme will be discussed below, dealt extensively with this matter, but the space 
available in this paper does not permit to do full justice to the topic.  
 31 Let it be noted explicitly that modern analysis would tell us that any rate of inflation is compatible with monetary 
equilibrium and therefore the absence of disequilibrium forced saving, just so long as it is properly anticipated in the 
term structure of nominal interest rates, a result stated by Eric Lindahl in  (1930), though its significance would not 
penetrate the literature beyond that written in Sweden till much later. Deflation at the rate of productivity growth 
remains of some analytic significance, however, because at that rate, when it is fully anticipated, the revenue 
accruing to the monetary system from seigniorage - what Robertson (1926) called “induced lacking”  is zero. See 
below for further discussion. 
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Austrian Policy Prescriptions 
Be that as it may, what seems to have undermined the reputation of Austrian cycle theory as the 
1930s progressed was not so much doubts about its coherence as a positive theory of the cycle, 
but some of the normative implications that were claimed to follow from it. These reversed the 
assignment of priorities between prevention and cure for financial and real instability implicit in 
quantity theoretic reasoning. Where Hawtrey, for example, advocated stabilising the price level, 
and meeting the consequences of any crises that might nevertheless occur with vigorous money 
creation after the event, the Austrians argued that the central policy problem was to prevent 
crises happening in the first place. This was to be accomplished by avoiding any net credit 
creation by the banking system, or, if the velocity of circulation could not be relied upon to 
remain stable, by varying credit creation so as to stabilise the rate of flow of money expenditure.  
 Where prevention had failed, as they thought it was very likely to do, the Austrians further, 
and crucially, argued that expansionary monetary policy, and/or fiscal measures designed to 
increase investment and consumption expenditures would make matters worse rather than better, 
and were to be avoided.32  In the aftermath of a crisis that had been brought about by excessive 
credit expansion, and excessive investment, and had been characterised by a demand for 
consumption goods in excess of the economy’s capacity to supply them, such measures were 
likely to lead to another and greater crisis rather than to provide a useful remedy for what ailed 
the economy.  
 It was for this reason that, in the early 1930s, the Austrians urged governments to remain 
passive and allow the passage of time to unwind the imbalances in the capital stock that they 
thought lay at the root of the depression. In so doing, they lent considerable academic 
respectability to similar views, based on the so-called needs of trade or real bills doctrine, which 
at that time had wide currency in banking circles in general, and at the Federal Reserve Board in 
particular. Exponents of the latter doctrine argued that, in the late 1920s, credit creation in the 
United States had gone beyond meeting the needs of firms for working capital and had fuelled an 
“artificial” investment boom. As a corollary they argued that, after 1929, any monetary 
expansion that did not await the revival of economic activity ran the risk of reigniting 
inflationary speculation.33 With the implementation of the New Deal, such views became 
                                                 
 32For a more detailed discussion of Austrian policy proposals, See Laidler (1999, pp 46-49) 
 33And the influence of such views had a great deal to do with the indecisiveness of Fed. policy during the Great 
Contraction, as both Currie (1934), and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued. For a contemporary example of such 
analysis, see Willis (1932). It is also worth noting that, partly, under the influence of Joseph Schumpeter’s own 
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increasingly unpopular, and Austrian cycle theory began to suffer from guilt by association, as 
for example, Friedman (1974) would later note.34 
 Lionel Robbins’ (1971) retrospective verdict on Austrian theory is worth quoting at some 
length. On the policy nihilism which he himself had supported in the early 1930s, he commented 
as follows:  
“On the assumption that the original diagnosis of excessive financial ease and mistaken 
real investment was correct - which is certainly not a settled matter - to treat what 
developed subsequently in the way which I then thought valid was as unsuitable as denying 
blankets and stimulants to a drunk who has fallen into an icy pond, on the grounds that his 
original problem was overheating. I shall always regard this aspect of my dispute with 
Keynes as the greatest mistake of my professional career, and the book The Great 
Depression, which I subsequently wrote, partly in justification of this attitude, as 
something which I would willingly see forgotten ” (p. 154)   
But he was somewhat kinder to the positive aspects of the theory : 
 “Now I still think that there is much in this theory as an explanation of a possible 
 generation of boom and crisis. I suspect that there are some episodes in economic 
history, the railway crisis of 1847 and the American crisis of 1907 for instance, on which it 
can cast valuable light. I am strengthened in this view that something like it, although with 
a different terminology and a different derivation, figures largely in one of Dennis 
Robertson’s models. But, as an explanation of what was going on in the early thirties, I 
now think it was misleading. Whatever the genetic factors of the pre-1929 boom, their 
sequelae, in the sense of inappropriate investments fostered by wrong expectations, were 
completely swamped by vast deflationary forces sweeping away all those elements of 
constancy in the situation which otherwise might have provided a framework for an 
explanation in my terms. The theory was inadequate to the facts ” (p. 154, Robbins’ italics)  
 Now Robbins’ mention of Robertson in this context is telling, Forced saving (often under 
the label “involuntary lacking”) does indeed figure prominently in the latter’s interwar work, but 
not as an explanation in and of itself of the crisis phase of the cycle. Rather, as we shall now see, 
it appears as one element in an altogether more eclectic story. 
                                                                                                                                                             
distinctive brand of Austrian analysis, a number of Harvard economists adopted a confused and sceptical attitude to 
activist policies intended to counter the contraction. See Brown et al. (1934)    
 34See Friedman (1974, pp.163-165) Unfortunately, in this passage, Friedman describes the Austrian view as an 
“atrophied and rigid caricature” of the quantity theory, thus displaying an extremely uncertain grasp of its 
intellectual origins. 
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Robertson’s Approach 
Just as certain political preconceptions underlay Austrian cycle theory, so was it with 
Robertson’s work. Nowadays he is mainly remembered as an effective critic of Keynes’s (1936) 
rejection of what the latter called “classical economics” and hence as something of a scientific 
conservative, but his work is in fact marked by the same scepticism about the self-regulating 
nature of the market economy and faith in the abilities of well informed policy makers to remedy 
this state of affairs as was Keynes’s. If he expressed these attitudes with less self-confidence, this 
had more to do with his personal style than with the depth of his convictions about these matters.  
 Robertson’s cycle theory had continental, and ultimately Marxist,  roots. He stressed waves 
of innovation as the basic source of fluctuations, and unlike those Cambridge economists more 
closely wedded to the quantity theory, he entertained the possibility that to this extent they were 
“appropriate” phenomena, whose stabilization might do more harm than good.  
“I do not feel confident that a policy which, in the pursuit of stability prices, output and 
employment, had nipped in the bud the English railway boom of the forties, or the 
American railway boom of 1869-71, or the German electrical boom of the nineties, would 
have been on the balance beneficial to the populations concerned.” (1926, p. 22).   
But in practice, Robertson thought it all too likely that “inappropriate” fluctuations in output 
would be overlaid upon the appropriate ones by the malfunctioning of the monetary system, and 
it was in this context that he deployed his analysis of forced saving. He developed this idea quite 
independently of Mises and Hayek, and indeed a little before the latter took it up, but his 
approach had much in common with theirs, as Robbins noted. Even so, in the context of this 
paper, it is the differences between the two versions of the doctrine that merit particular 
attention. 
 As we have seen, forced saving occurs when an economy operating at full employment is 
disturbed by the opening up of a discrepancy between Wicksellian natural and market rates of 
interest. Although the Austrians recognised that shocks to the system could arise in principle 
from either the real or monetary side of the equation, in practice they treated the banking system 
as the main source of disturbances. Not so Robertson, for whom inappropriate fluctuations in 
output were usually the result of market interest rates failing to catch up with the effects of 
innovation on the expected returns to investment. Quite unlike the Austrians, moreover, he was 
even willing to contemplate the possibility that forced saving, though usually destructive, might 
in some circumstances have a beneficial effect. Specifically, he lacked confidence in the capacity 
of the short-end of the market automatically to provide the working capital needed to bring plant 
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and equipment into production once it had been created, and looked to the banking system to 
provide firms with the means of acquiring it.35 
 “I am not sure that a little forced saving now and again may not be the necessary price we 
have to pay for what we call progress, and that a doctrinaire application of the principle of 
price-stabilisation in all circumstances might not be inimical to the rapid growth of 
economic welfare.” (1928b, p. 145).         
 Evidently, then, Robertson did not regard forced saving as an inevitable harbinger of crisis 
in the way that the Austrian did. In part, this open-mindedness stemmed from greater analytic 
sophistication on Robertson’s part. Unlike Mises, Hayek, Robbins, or anyone else in that camp, 
he understood that, because rising prices would reduce the real value of the public’s cash 
holdings,  “it is at least possible that some of them will seek to restore this real value towards its 
old level, and to that end to refrain from consumption . . .” (1928b, p. 134) This effect, which in 
(1926) he had labelled “induced lacking”, is the very one that lies at the heart of analyses of the 
extraction of seigniorage in modern models of fully anticipated inflation, and in principle it 
would ensure that the banking system could continuously transfer resources from the public at 
large to firms without the process breaking down. The saving needed to finance the extra 
investment would be voluntary, in the sense that it would arise from the payment of what we 
now call the inflation tax.36 
 Even so, Robertson understood just as well as did the Austrians that forced saving could 
occur in a growing economy without prices having to rise, and he also believed, as did they, that 
it had considerable potential to do harm. That is why, in 1928, he expressed trepidation at the 
way events were unfolding in the United States: “. . .in so far as the Federal System [sic] has not 
gone all out for stabilising the price of labour, it cannot, I think, be wholly absolved from the 
charge of having burgled from the public in these years of rapidly advancing productivity” 
                                                 
 35Robertson’s particular stress on the provision of short-term capital by way of forced saving reflects the practices 
of the British and American commercial banking systems. Any careful comparison of Austrian and Robertsonian 
treatments of forced saving needs to pay attention to the different assumptions about the nature of banking 
institutions that were usually left implicit in their analysis. 
 36In this context, Robertson’s acknowledgement that the analysis of induced lacking was suggested to him by 
Keynes is worth noting, since the latter had already set out a treatment of the inflation tax in the Tract (1923).On this 
See Laidler (1999, pp.95-96, pp.110-111).  Harry Johnson  (1974) pointed out the relationship between the analysis 
of forced saving as developed by Robertson in the 1920s, and that of the inflation tax, seigniorage and the revenue 
from money creation (the three terms are synonymous). The latter topic was much discussed among monetary 
theorists for two decades following the work of Martin Bailey (1956) and a key contribution which either avoided or 
cleared up the many analytic confusions that permeated  much earlier work was Alvin Marty (1976) 
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(1928b, p. 144, Robertson’s italics). He particularly feared for the consequences “if that great 
country should ever become even temporarily saturated with 50-storey buildings and motor cars” 
(p. 146 Robertson’s italics), noting that 
 “The out-and-out price-stabiliser claims that he can always check a fall in prices and cure 
unemployment by monetary means . . . I think the difficulties experienced by the Federal 
Reserve system even in times of raging prosperity should make us pause before admitting 
such extreme claims.” (1928b,  p. 146) 
Not that Robertson came anywhere near to Austrian nihilism in his prescriptions for policy in the 
event of a crisis. On the contrary he was just as much an activist as any of the Cambridge 
economists discussed earlier in this paper37. 
          “. . .the ideal banking policy might be one which was founded on the principle of price-
stabilisation as a norm, but which was ready to see the fruits of a prolonged and general 
increase in individual productivity shared in the form of lower prices, and perhaps to 
acquiesce in moderate price-rises in order that advantage might be taken of discontinuous 
leaps in industrial technique. And it would be a policy that did not claim omnipotence, or 
feel competent of its ability to cure the evils of uncertainty except in alliance with a much 
more comprehensive attempt to control and stabilise the desires and activities of the 
community than most monetary reformers - even I think, the most thorough-going 
Socialists - have yet visualised” (1928b, p. 146)    
 Robertson’s avoidance of Austrian policy conclusions about how to deal with crisis and  
the depression which would inevitable follow it, despite his belief in the capacity of forced 
saving to generate excessive investment, has a very simple and down-to-earth explanation, 
namely that he invariably associated such investment with the over-expansion of particular 
sectors of the economy, rather than with the creation of an economy-wide imbalance in the 
capital stock.  He therefore believed that there was always scope to fill any void in demand 
stemming from a private sector collapse, as his following comment on the desirability of 
deploying counter-cyclical public expenditure policies makes clear.  
“What, after all, can be more sensible than that the Central government should organise a 
collective demand for telephone equipment, or the local governments a collective demand 
for municipal lavatories, to take the place of an individual demand for ships or steel rails, 
which has rightly and reasonably fallen temporarily away?”  (1928a, p. 178)  
                                                 
 37It should be noted that, just as Pigou came to pay increasing attention to forced saving as the 1920s progressed, so 
did Robertson appreciate the potential significance of error. See Laidler (1999, pp.89-90, 98-99)  
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Some Tentative Lessons  
To draw conclusions from an earlier literature about current monetary policy is always risky. No 
matter what some might claim about the universality of the laws of economic science, it has 
often been observed that monetary economics in particular evolves along with monetary 
institutions, and the possibility that conclusions drawn at an earlier time, might have lost their 
validity with the passage of time is ever present.38 But recent bouts of asset market instability 
and associated problems in the real economy, do seem to present puzzles that contemporary 
economic theory has trouble getting to grips with, and they do bear more than a passing 
resemblance to earlier episodes, so perhaps the literature discussed in this paper might have 
something to tell us about our present problems. 
 
Continuity and Discontinuity in Economic Ideas 
As we saw above, there is considerable continuity in what has here been called the quantity-
theoretic approach to the cycle in particular, and asset market instability in particular. Its current 
exponents still argue that monetary policy cannot be expected to do more than influence the price 
level, and the differences between their advocacy of targets for low inflation and the preferences 
of, say Marshall, Hawtrey or the Keynes of the Tract, for outright price level stability are surely 
of minor significance to anyone who believes that the virtues of such policy goals should be 
analysed on the assumption that the inflation rate is fully anticipated. Furthermore, they are every 
bit as insistent on the rapid deployment of the central bank’s powers of money creation, should 
things nevertheless go wrong, as their inter-war predecessors. 
 There is less continuity between the ideas of  inter-war and contemporary critics of the 
quantity theoretic tradition. Like their predecessors, of course, the latter are still concerned with 
the apparent inability of a monetary policy geared solely to the general price level to forestall 
instability in asset markets, and they also suggest that monetary policy should try to deal with 
this phenomenon. But beyond this point, differences begin to appear. Nowadays, the case that 
monetary policy should concern itself with asset prices is mainly justified by the possibility that 
banking systems can cease to function efficiently as providers of credit to the private sector once 
asset market instability turns into outright crisis. Interwar economists did not neglect instability 
in asset markets or the banking system in particular, or indeed financial markets more generally, 
but dissenters from quantity theoretic analysis among them paid far more attention to the 
                                                 
 38This was a constant theme in the later writings of Sir John Hicks, right down to his final book (1989), and it 
permeates the post-Keynesian writings of Victoria Chick: eg  (1992)  
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possibility that such difficulties reflected altogether deeper problems with the structure of the 
real economy. The Austrians aside, moreover, they adopted a far more activist approach to 
macroeconomic policy than anything that is to be found among critics of current policy 
orthodoxy, whose main concern seems to be that monetary policy should look beyond stabilising 
the inflation rate, and pay special attention to asset prices. 
 
Co-ordination Failures 
I conjecture that the reason for this latter difference, and also for our current perplexity about 
how monetary policy should be configured in the light of the experience of Japan, or more 
recently the United States, to mention but two examples, stems from the fact that much of 
economics as it is now widely taught has tried to settle an old debate about a matter of real 
substance by methodological fiat. That old debate, whose importance Axel Leijonhufvud (eg. 
1981, 1999) has long stressed, reached a peak in the inter-war years. It was about whether, and, if 
not, the extent to which, the institutions of a market economy were up to the task of 
harmoniously co-ordinating the maximising decisions of self-interested individual agents. 
Nowadays, this debate is short-circuited by the widely held belief that good scientific practice 
requires us to assume that markets always clear, unless specific reasons rooted in maximising 
behaviour conditioned on all relevant and available information can be given for assuming 
otherwise.39  This belief has led much economic theory to take it for granted that the interest rate, 
or the term structure thereof, successfully co-ordinates the allocation of resources over time, 
even though this assumption makes it very hard to understand such phenomena as canals and 
railways that lead to nowhere, see-through office buildings, mile upon mile of redundant fibre-
optic cable, etc. 
 In earlier times, when, by and large, economists started with facts to be explained, and 
worked backwards to more and more general explanations, it was regarded as methodologically 
legitimate to postulate co-ordination failures to account for observations without first of all 
having to rationalise these in terms of some set of deeper (and allegedly first) principles. And 
                                                 
 39But not by everyone: I have already mentioned Victoria Chick’s contribution to the post-Keynesian literature, and 
Axel  Leijonhufvud’s constant and eloquent insistence of the importance of co-ordination issues and to the rich inter-
war literature dealing with them, continues to do so). Garrison (2001) to which I have also referred above represents 
a recent and refreshingly unorthodox attempt to blend insights culled from quantity theoretic and Austrian 
approaches to the cycle into an account of the phenomenon that places co-ordination failures at the centre of things. 
But students trained in mainstream modern macroeconomics find it hard to come to grips with such contributions 
because they are not susceptible to the equilibrium modelling techniques in which they are so well drilled.   
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given the facts of 19th century fluctuations, let alone those of the inter-war years, this seemed like 
a reasonable procedure. The key positive question underlying the literature discussed in this 
paper was, that is to say, what sort of co-ordination failure was responsible for observed 
fluctuations, and the key normative question was what policy should do about it. These seem to 
me to remain interesting questions, even if the current rules of the game make it embarrassing to 
pose them in respectable academic circles. 
 Exponents of a quantity-theoretic approach to fluctuations located co-ordination failures in 
the slowness of interest rates and money wages to respond to swings in the price level, an 
argument implying that the maintenance of price stability would prevent their occurrence. Some 
of these exponents, for example Fisher, were sufficiently confident of this way of looking at 
things that they argued that a price stability rule would be sufficient to guarantee overall 
economic stability. Others, for example Hawtrey and those whom he influenced, were more 
cautious and were willing to settle for discretionary policy. Furthermore, after the events of 
1928-1930 had confirmed that things could nevertheless go badly wrong against a background of 
apparently stable inflation, they continued to argue that vigorous monetary expansion would 
suffice to prevent a cyclical downturn getting out of hand. Austrian theorists, on the other hand, 
stressed the capacity of any monetary expansion to generate forced saving, urged that the 
authorities should try to stabilize the level of money expenditure to prevent this happening, and, 
took a fatalistic attitude to the consequences of failure. Quantity theorists and Austrians 
nevertheless had an important belief in common, namely that malfunctions of the monetary 
system, rather than any deeper flaw in the workings of market mechanisms underlay co-
ordination failures, and that appropriate (albeit very different) monetary measures could in 
principle prevent them.  
 In this these two groups differed strongly from those who argued that the very process of 
economic growth in a market economy was inherently prone to such failures. These arguments 
came in many disguises, ranging from the Pigou-Lavington hypothesis that investment behaviour 
was systematically subject to error, to an altogether more thoroughgoing Marxist belief, as 
represented, say, by Loewe, in the instability of Capitalism. Commensurate with their playing 
down the importance of the monetary system itself as a source of instability, these economists 
cast doubt on the sufficiency of any purely monetary cure for such problems, and many of them, 
for example the Cambridge economists, including Robertson, and eventually Keynes, advocated 
an activist stabilisation policy with a strong fiscal component aimed in particular at dealing with 
the consequences of instability in investment. 
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Implications for Present Day Monetary Policy 
Certain facts of economic history can help us to make tentative choices among these competing 
views. To begin with, in their light, it seems unlikely that traditional quantity theoretic 
explanations of the cycle tell the whole story. One episode of serious financial instability 
occurring without a prior burst of general price inflation, such as that which preceded the Great 
Depression, might be written off as an anomaly, but, as was noted at the outset of this paper, we 
have seen too much of this recently not to take seriously the possibility that price stability alone 
is not a sufficient condition for more general stability. But it seems even less likely that Austrian 
analysis tells the whole story either. As was noted earlier, the account of the cycle given by 
Mises, Hayek, Robbins et al.  treated logical possibilities as logical necessities and seriously 
oversold its central message.  
 But, that being said, inter-temporal co-ordination failures aided and abetted by the 
monetary system are both logically possible, and they do seem to happen. Quantity theoretic 
models of the cycle certainly have long had room for them to occur when nominal interest rates 
fail to keep up with inflation, and hence permit the real market rate of interest to fall short of the 
real natural rate. Most speculative bubbles and subsequent collapses do seem to be accompanied 
by price level instability. But co-ordination failures also sometimes happen without a burstbof 
inflation giving prior warning that something is amiss: how else does one account for all that 
surplus office space in the early 1990s, and all that surplus fibre-optic cable in the wake of the 
high-tech bubble?  When all the over-generalizations are stripped away from Austrian theory, 
there still remains a hard core of insight: namely, that discrepancies between the market and 
natural rates of interest with a capacity for damaging the real economy can arise even in the 
absence of inflation. This insight seems to be valid far beyond Austrian theory’s own narrow and 
ideologically drawn boundaries, as Robertson’s work clearly showed, as Robbins later 
acknowledged, and as Garrison has more recently reaffirmed. Nor, incidentally, is it obviously 
incompatible with a quantity theoretic analysis that is constructed broadly enough to allow 
productivity shocks and/or what the Cambridge economists called errors of optimism, to happen 
against a tranquil monetary background and independently of the activities of the banking 
system. 
 At first glance, it is hard to resist the conclusion that a monetary regime geared solely 
towards generating low inflation is not in and of itself sufficient to guarantee economic stability, 
to allow that monetary policy needs to become more ambitious, and perhaps even to concede that 
a more generally activist approach to macro-stabilization needs to be re-considered. Some of us, 
who remember where policies like that led from the1960s to the 1980s, however, are bound to 
resist this last step, and perhaps even the one that precedes it too, and for the present, we can take 
some comfort from certain other facts. After all, vigorous monetary expansion, based on the 
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central bank’s lender of last resort powers, was not tried after the stock-market collapsed 1929, 
nor was such a policy implemented after the Japanese “bubble economy” came to grief in 1991. 
Thus, it is not clear from these episodes that a traditional quantity theoretic approach to monetary 
policy is inadequate.   
 At the time of writing, moreover, after the collapse of the high-tech bubble of the late 
1990s, the Federal Reserve system does seem to be taking the advice of Hawtrey, Currie, 
Friedman and Schwartz, et al. to heart.  Perhaps, then, timely monetary expansion will succeed in 
staving off stagnation in the U.S., and if it does, then the systematic pursuit of low inflation by 
central banks which are also ready to be lenders of last resort when things go wrong in asset 
markets, will be a defensible monetary policy regime after all. If it does not, then we shall indeed 
have to consider something more ambitious. Here, it is worth recalling that regulatory 
frameworks for financial markets that we take for granted nowadays are mainly products of the 
1930s and after, and would surely have looked like the creations of “thorough-going Socialists” 
to most of Robertson’s readers in 1928. There may be room to deploy these more actively than 
has been done in the recent past to stabilise asset markets, when the latter threaten to create 
dislocations in the real economy, while continuing to rely on low inflation as the centrepiece of 
monetary policy. This would certainly be worth trying, because, if the more generalized 
activism, that Robertson and his colleagues so confidently recommended were ever again to re-
emerge as the alternative of choice to current policies, we could not be nearly as sure as were 
they were that it would end up doing more good than harm this time around. 
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